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INTRODUCTION 
While being booked at the Orient Road jail in Tampa, Florida on a traf-
fic warrant, Brian Sterner was subjected to a “routine” pat-down search.  
 
∗ Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law.  This Article was pre-
sented at the Fordham Urban Law Journal’s Colloquium on Conditions of Confinement.  I 
owe thanks to Alexander Reinert for wise comments on an earlier draft and to David Skill-
man for excellent research assistance. 
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Mr. Sterner, who is quadriplegic, was ordered to stand for the search.  
When, for obvious reasons, he remained in his wheelchair, a Sheriff’s dep-
uty forcefully dumped him from his chair, while other jail staff looked on.  
The deputy and another jail official then proceeded to search Mr. Sterner 
while he lay prone on the floor and when they were through, they dragged 
him back into his chair.  Shortly afterward, jail personnel placed him on the 
floor of a van without his wheelchair or any other device to keep him se-
cure and transported him approximately four miles to another jail facility.1  
What is most unusual about this incident is not how Mr. Sterner was 
treated, but that it was actually captured on surveillance video, uncovered 
by the media, and viewed hundreds of thousands of times on YouTube.2 
Orient Road Jail and Abu Ghraib notwithstanding, it is highly unusual 
for the American public to glimpse what goes on behind the walls of our 
prisons and jails.  If they could, they would see all too many incidents like 
the one involving Mr. Sterner, in which prisoners and detainees with dis-
abilities experience abuse, discrimination, and inequitable access to ser-
vices.  There is a long history of discrimination against prisoners with dis-
abilities, some of which is made public through civil rights litigation 
brought by prisoners.  In one such case, prison officials were found to have 
denied access to a paralyzed prisoner who was forced to drag his body 
across the floor to use the commode, which was not adequate to support 
him.3  In another case a quadriplegic prisoner was denied access to prison 
facilities, therapeutic, and religious programs that were available to non-
disabled prisoners.4  In another example, deaf prisoners were denied sign 
language interpreters for medical appointments and disciplinary hearings.5 
Congress considered this history of discrimination against prisoners with 
disabilities in enacting Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act6 
(“ADA” or “Title II”) in 1990, and the Supreme Court unanimously de-
cided more than a decade ago that the law applies to state prisoners.7  
 
 1. Casey Cora & Rodney Thrash, Treatment of Disabled Man Attracts National Spot-
light, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, available at http://www.sptimes.com/ 
2008/02/13/news_pf/Hillsborough/Treatment_of_disabled.shtml. 
 2. See, e.g., YouTube, Deputies Dump Paralyzed Man from Wheelchair, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UAGb7_g4Aso (last visited Sept. 27, 2008); YouTube, 
Police Dump Quadriplegic from Wheelchair, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UYMKy 
JRAabE&feature=related (last visited Sept. 27, 2008). 
 3. See LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 4. See Love v. McBride, 896 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ind 1995). 
 5. See Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 6. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §12101 (2006)). 
 7. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998). 
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Nonetheless, attempts of state prisoners with disabilities to seek damages8 
for violations of the ADA have often been thwarted, as courts have found 
states to be immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.9 
While the primary focus of disability rights cases brought by prisoners 
has been under the ADA, its less comprehensive predecessor statute, Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act10 is also applicable in most of these cases 
and poses fewer sovereign immunity problems.  Both statutes continue to 
be important tools for prisoners and their advocates for several reasons.  
First, the changing demographics of the prison population reveal that the 
number of prisoners with disabilities has increased and is likely to continue 
to increase.  Furthermore, there are several reasons why proceeding under 
Title II or Section 504 offers some advantages over traditional constitu-
tional claims.  The federal disability statutes provide, in some circum-
stances, increased substantive rights for prisoners than does the Constitu-
tion.  The statutes also promote greater legal access than constitutional 
claims because they provide for greater access to attorneys’ and experts’ 
fees and are not subject to the defense of qualified immunity.  Despite the 
potential advantages that these statutory claims carry, ADA litigants are 
faced with a significant roadblock in the sovereign immunity that is granted 
to the states.  Given the sovereign immunity problem associated with ADA 
damages claims, I explore the important differences between the ADA and 
Section 504 and argue that there are situations in which prisoners and their 
advocates should take steps to avoid the sovereign immunity problem alto-
gether by suing under Section 504 only. 
In Part I, I explore the demographics of the prison population, noting the 
dramatic increase in prisoners with disabilities and discussing its various 
causes.  Lengthy sentences and the resulting aging of the prison population, 
the over incarceration of people with mental illness and the link between 
poverty and disability all contribute to the explosion in the population of 
disabled prisoners.  The importance of the ADA and Section 504 as tools 
available to prisoners with disabilities is heightened by this demographic 
shift.  In Part II, I continue to address the importance of these statutory 
claims by highlighting some of their advantages over traditional constitu-
tional claims.  I categorize these advantages as either being substantive or 
 
 8. Because a narrow exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity exists for suits 
brought against individuals in their official capacity, where prospective relief is sought, Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166-68 (1908), this Article focuses solely on claims for dam-
ages.  . 
 9. See, e.g., Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor 205 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 10. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)). 
GINSBERG_CHRISTENSEN 6/15/2009  12:44:32 PM 
716 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
as pertaining to legal access.  With respect to substance, claims under the 
disability statutes are arguably easier to prove than claims under the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because courts 
have held Eighth Amendment claimants to an extremely stringent standard 
and because the statutes impose an affirmative obligation upon public enti-
ties to provide accommodations for people with disabilities.  Furthermore, 
because there is no respondeat superior liability for Section 1983 claims, 
these can be more difficult to prove than claims under the disability stat-
utes, which allow for both respondeat superior and entity liability.  The 
statutes also provide better legal access to plaintiffs because ADA and Sec-
tion 504 defendants are not entitled to claim qualified immunity as are de-
fendants in Section 1983 litigation.  Furthermore, the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act’s severe restrictions on attorneys’ fees do not apply to the 
disability statutes.  Finally, while fees for expert witnesses are not available 
to Section 1983 plaintiffs, they are available to ADA claimants.  Part II also 
points out the few, but significant, advantages of constitutional claims over 
statutory claims for prisoners with disabilities. 
Part III discusses how courts have addressed the question of states’ sov-
ereign immunity from claims under the ADA and Section 504.  It con-
cludes that while sovereign immunity remains a barrier for prisoner plain-
tiffs bringing ADA claims, sovereign immunity is not a barrier to 
prisoners’ Section 504 claims.  Although it appeared that in 2006 the Su-
preme Court would resolve whether Congress validly abrogated 
states’sovereign immunity from ADA claims concerning prison conditions, 
the Court left much of this question open; it has since been addressed in di-
vergent ways by the lower courts.  Because Section 504 was enacted pursu-
ant to the Spending Clause, the abrogation analysis is not dispositive for 
plaintiffs seeking damages from the state.  The question of whether states 
accepting federal funds has constituted a valid waiver of sovereign immu-
nity has been answered uniformly and positively.  Part IV addresses the dif-
ferences between Section 504 and the ADA.  While courts regularly find 
that the statutes are virtually identical, there are some distinctions between 
them that litigants may need to recognize when determining whether Sec-
tion 504’s sovereign immunity advantage is worth abandoning claims un-
der the ADA.  Finally, Part V suggests an approach for litigants that in-
volves abandoning the traditional kitchen-sink approach to civil rights 
litigation in favor of a more nuanced and strategic approach that takes into 
account the advantages and disadvantages of statutory versus constitutional 
claims, the problems posed by sovereign immunity and the differences be-
tween the two statutes. 
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I.  DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE PRISON POPULATION 
The ADA and Section 504 are becoming increasingly important tools for 
prisoners seeking redress through the legal system.  This is not only be-
cause these statutes offer certain advantages over constitutional claims, as 
shown below.  The demographics of the prison population are such that the 
population of incarcerated people with disabilities is disproportionately 
large and growing.  There are several reasons for this.  First, because our 
criminal justice system has been imposing longer sentences on people who 
have been convicted of crimes, the prison population is aging before re-
lease.  With increased age often comes disability.  Next, the deinstitution-
alization of people with mental illness in the last half of twentieth century 
and the lack of adequate mental health treatment have led to the over-
incarceration of people with mental disabilities.  Finally, because people 
with disabilities are more likely than the non-disabled to live in poverty and 
because there are close links between poverty and crime, people with dis-
abilities are overrepresented in prison. 
In recent years, states have enacted legislation and promulgated policies 
that have greatly affected the make-up of the prison population.  Not only 
have approximately half of the states enacted “three strikes” legislation,11 
but many states have also enacted both “truth in sentencing” laws that en-
sure that offenders serve far longer sentences than previously, and parole 
policies that delay or deny release to prisoners serving indeterminate sen-
tences.12  Furthermore, many states have adopted laws requiring certain of-
fenders to serve sentences of life without the possibility of parole, ensuring 
that these prisoners age and eventually die inside prison.13  These harsh 
sentencing policies, requiring lengthy prison sentences necessarily lead to 
people growing old in prison.14 
In fact, elderly prisoners—those over the age of fifty—are the fastest 
growing age group in the prison population.  For example, in California, 
 
 11. RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AGING BEHIND BARS:  
“THREE STRIKES” SEVEN YEARS LATER  (2001), available at http://sentencingproject.org/ 
Admin/Documents/publications/inc_aging.pdf. 
 12. RONALD H. ADAY, AGING PRISONERS:  CRISIS IN AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 10-11 
(2003). 
 13. Catherine Appleton & Bent Grover, The Pros and Cons of Life Without Parole, 47 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY. 597 (2007) (noting that most states that permit the death penalty re-
quire a sentence of life without parole for anyone convicted of capital or first degree murder 
and that many states require life without parole sentences for crimes involving homicide as 
well as drug offenses, greatly increasing the number of prisoners who age and die in prison). 
 14. ADAY, supra note 12, at 11. 
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13% of the prison population is fifty years old or older; as a decade ago, the 
elderly population made up only 6% of the population.15 
Recognizing that their prison populations are aging, some states have 
built prisons specifically designed to address the needs of the growing 
population of prisoners with disabilities.16 As the Department of Justice re-
cently commented in its findings relating to its proposed amendments to the 
Title II regulations, “[w]ith thousands of prisoners serving life sentences 
without eligibility for parole, prisoners are aging, and the prison population 
of individuals with disabilities and elderly individuals is growing.”17  
Physical and mental changes often come with age, such as progressive loss 
of physical mobility, hearing, and sight, as well as decreased mental capac-
ity.18  While the types of geriatric mental health problems are substantially 
the same as those experienced by the general population, there is a greater 
prevalence of such problems among the older prison population.19  Simi-
larly, there is a greater incidence of physical disabilities among elderly 
prisoners.20 
In addition to harsh sentencing laws contributing to the increase in peo-
ple with disabilities who are in prison, the over-incarceration of people 
with mental disabilities further increases these numbers.  Individuals with 
mental illness are significantly overrepresented in our prisons.  While about 
5% of the general population suffers from mental illness, studies show that 
between 8% and 19% of the prison population has a significant psychiatric 
disability and an additional 15% to 20% of prisoners will require some 
form of mental health intervention during the course of their incarcera-
 
 15. Don Thompson, Aging Inmates Add to Prison Strain in California, S.F. GATE, July 
5, 2008, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2008/07/05/state/ 
n090037D66.DTL&tsp=1 (discussing the rising costs to California taxpayers of caring for 
more elderly prisoners serving longer sentences under California’s Three Strikes Rule). 
 16. Angel Riggs, Now in Business:  Handicapped Accessible Prison;  State Opens First 
Prison for Disabled, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 20, 2007, available at 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?articleID=070220_Ne_A1_pstxc44709. 
 17. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Ser-
vices, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,465, 34,494 (June 17, 2008) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, 36) 
(discussing the reasons for the increased numbers of complaints concerning a lack of acces-
sible cells by disabled inmate). 
 18. See ADAY, supra note 12, at 19-20. 
 19. Jill Doerner et al., The Consequences of Incarceration on Aging Prisoners:  An Ex-
amination of Well-Being and Overall Health Outcomes, Presentation at the annual meeting 
of the, Am. Soc’y of Criminolgy, Atlanta Marriott Marquis, Atlanta, Georgia, Nov. 14, 
2007, available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/ 
2/0/1/2/1/p201213_index.html. 
 20. Id. 
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tion.21  Although estimates of the size of the population of prisoners with 
mental disabilities vary, there is a consensus that they are disproportion-
ately represented in prisons, causing concerns that our prisons are ware-
houses for the mentally ill.22  Many attribute the ever growing number of 
the incarcerated mentally ill to the deinstitutionalization of fifty years 
ago.23  With the closing of public mental hospitals, hundreds of thousands 
of people with mental illness were released to communities that were and 
continue to be ill-prepared to care for them.  The utter lack of community 
mental health services, particularly for the poor, has resulted in the crimi-
nalization of the mentally ill.24 
Finally, because disability and poverty are closely linked and because 
poverty and incarceration are closely linked, there is likely to be an over-
representation of people with disabilities in prisons.  Living with a disabil-
ity is often a cause of poverty; a life of poverty can cause or exacerbate dis-
abilities.25  The clear link between poverty and committing crime26 
indicates a likelihood that people with disabilities will be overrepresented 
in prisons. 
II.  ADVANTAGES OF STATUTORY DISABILITY-RIGHTS CLAIMS OVER 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
The federal disability statutes are not only of great interest because of 
the increased number of people with disabilities behind bars who might 
seek to enforce them, but also because they provide prisoners with disabili-
ties with significant advantages over more traditional constitutional claims.  
This Article characterizes some of these advantages as substantive; that is, 
they provide litigants with more favorable standards, making it easier to 
 
 21. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED, U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS 2003, at 17 (2003) [hereinafter ILL EQUIPPED]. 
 22. See, e.g., id. at 18; William Kanapaux, Guilty of Mental Illness, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, 
Jan. 1, 2004, http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/10168/47631?pagenumber=1. 
 23. In the mid-twentieth century, people with severe psychiatric disabilities were gener-
ally housed in mental hospitals.  For a number of reasons, including the horrible conditions 
of these hospitals and the advent of new psychiatric medications, starting around 1960, the 
process of deinstitutionalizing the mentally ill began.  See ILL EQUIPPED, supra note 21, at 
19-20. 
 24. Id. at 19-21.  This is a crude explanation for a complicated phenomenon. For pur-
poses of this Article, however, what is important is an understanding that our prisons are 
filled with people with disabilities. 
 25. Sam Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (2004) (citing 
COMM. ON A NAT’L AGENDA FOR THE PREVENTION OF DISABILITIES, INST. OF MED., DISABIL-
ITY IN AMERICA:  TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR PREVENTION 47 (1991)). 
 26. See, e.g., Richard A. Berk et al., Crime and Poverty:  Some Experimental Evidence 
from Ex-Offenders, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 766, 766 (1980). 
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prevail on claims of disability-based discrimination or lack of program ac-
cess.  Others of these advantages the Article categorizes as pertaining to le-
gal access, enabling prisoners to even have their claims heard on the merits 
at all. 
A. Advantages of Statutory Claims:  Issues of Substantive Law 
1. Eighth Amendment Claims 
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment is the predominant constitutional provision cited by prisoners with 
disabilities challenging their treatment in prison.  A plaintiff seeking to 
challenge the conditions of his or her confinement under the Eighth 
Amendment must show that prison officials showed deliberate indifference 
to a serious need.27  Thus, the test for whether prison officials have violated 
the Eighth Amendment contains both a subjective and an objective ele-
ment.  A plaintiff seeking relief under the disability statutes must show that 
he or she is a qualified individual with a disability who has been denied the 
programs, services, or activities of a public entity or who has experienced 
discrimination by the public entity because of his or her disability.28 
The deliberate indifference standard under the Eighth Amendment is 
similar to the requirement that plaintiffs seeking compensatory damages 
under Title II and Section 504 show discriminatory intent on the part of 
prison officials.  Under the Eighth Amendment, deliberate indifference re-
quires a showing that a prison official disregarded a risk of harm of which 
he was aware.29  Unlike deliberate indifference in other contexts,30 here it is 
truly a subjective standard; that prison officials should have known that a 
risk of harm does not meet the standard.31 
Liability under Title II and Section 504 does not require proof of intent.  
However, because this Article focuses on a disabled prisoner’s ability to 
pursue damage claims, it is important to note that in the Title II and Section 
504 contexts, most courts have described the state of mind required to ob-
 
 27. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-
05 (1991). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006); United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 143 (2006). 
 29. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 
 30. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989) (holding that deliberate in-
difference is the standard for determining whether municipalities are liable under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 for failure to train officials resulting in constitutional deprivations, and that the stan-
dard is an objective one). 
 31. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-43. 
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tain compensatory damages as deliberate indifference.32  However, there is 
no clear or universal interpretation of what deliberate indifference means in 
this context.  It seems that at least some courts treat the standard as an ob-
jective one,33 while others do not make clear whether the standard is objec-
tive or subjective.34  Very little can be drawn from any possible distinction 
between the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard and the 
ADA/Section 504 deliberate indifference standard.  It is impossible to say 
with a degree of certainty that a court would apply a more favorable delib-
erate indifference standard to claims brought under the disability statutes 
than to those brought as Eighth Amendment Claims.  This is particularly so 
as the line between the subjective and objective versions of deliberate indif-
ference are not always plain.  For instance, the obviousness of a risk of 
harm may support an inference of actual knowledge under the subjective 
Eighth Amendment standard35, whereas an obvious risk under the objective 
standard can support a finding of constructive knowledge.  Thus, the Title 
II state of mind requirement is either the same or slightly more favorable to 
plaintiffs than the Eighth Amendment standard. 
The objective prong of the Eighth Amendment test requires that the de-
liberate indifference be to “excessive risks to inmate health or safety”36 or 
that the conditions at issue be “sufficiently serious.”37  Title II and Section 
504 have no such requirements, and this is where the statutes may be seen 
to provide a more favorable standard for plaintiffs than the Eighth Amend-
ment.  The statutes require that prisoners with disabilities are provided with 
access to programs, services, and activities that the prison provides to the 
general population.  Failure to provide qualified prisoners with disabilities 
access to certain prison services, such as showers and toilets, would likely 
 
 32. See, e.g., Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 364 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999); Ferguson v. City 
of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 33. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
“[d]eliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right 
is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood”).  Id. at 1139.  For this 
proposition, the court cited City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), which held that 
deliberate indifference in the context of claims against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 does not have a state of mind requirement and required a showing of obviousness. 
 34. Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998), va-
cated on other grounds by 527 U.S. 1031 (1999). 
 35. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43; see, e.g., Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 343 (5th Cir. 
2004) (stating deliberate indifference supported by “obvious and pervasive nature” of  chal-
lenged conditions). 
 36. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. 
 37. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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violate the Eighth Amendment as well as the disability statutes.38  It is, 
however, unlikely that the Eighth Amendment would provide relief to a 
prisoner who was denied access to educational or vocational programs on 
the basis of disability. 
Perhaps even more advantageous to ADA and Section 504 litigants is 
the statutes’ affirmative obligation imposed upon public entities to make 
reasonable modifications so that people with disabilities can participate in 
its programs and activities.39  A reasonable modification claim does not re-
quire a plaintiff to show intentional discrimination on the part of a prison 
official.  The ADA’s requirement that public entities provide reasonable 
accommodations is not, however, without limits.  Defenses available to 
public entities permit them to deny accommodations that are unreasonable 
or that fundamentally alter the nature of the program, service, or activity.40  
Nonetheless, the Eighth Amendment imposes no such affirmative burden to 
accommodate on prison officials. 
There are, of course, prison conditions experienced by people with dis-
abilities that cannot provide the basis for a claim under the ADA or Section 
504, but that do sound in the Eighth Amendment.  Most notable among 
these are claims regarding inadequate medical treatment by prison authori-
ties.  Claims regarding poor medical treatment are simply not litigable un-
der the statutes unless the lacking treatment can be adequately connected to 
the prison’s failure to make prison programs available to people with dis-
abilities or to disability-based discrimination.41  These claims are, however, 
properly litigated under the Eighth Amendment.42 
2. Respondeat Superior and Entity Liability 
Under Section 1983, state officials cannot be held liable for the acts of 
their agents on a respondeat superior basis.43  Furthermore, states and their 
 
 38. See Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that allega-
tions by paraplegic prisoner of denial of, inter-alia, wheelchair-accessible showers and toi-
lets, raised issues of material fact under the Eighth Amendment), vacated and superseded on 
other grounds by 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 39. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007); Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 
431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005); Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638 
(1st Cir. 2000). 
 40. § 35.130(b)(7). 
 41. See, e.g., Rashad v. Doughty, 2001 WL 68708, at *1 (10th Cir. 2001); Bryant v. 
Madigan, 84 F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 42. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 43. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that 
municipalities cannot be held liable on a respondeat basis); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 
1242 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability for state officials 
under Section 1983).  The Monell court held that while a municipality cannot be held vicari-
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agencies cannot be held liable under Section 1983.44  Although Section 
1983 permits supervisory liability against state officials, such liability can 
only be premised upon a showing of the supervisor’s personal involvement 
in the commission of the wrong.45  Conversely, Title II and Section 504 
permit entity liability as well as suits against states and state agencies on a 
respondeat superior theory.46  The ability to hold officials vicariously liable 
for the actions of their subordinates can be a significant litigation advan-
tage.  For instance, at the pleading stage of an ADA or Title II case, it is not 
necessary to know the names of the individuals involved in committing the 
violation when suing agencies.  However, in Section 1983 cases, the indi-
viduals alleged to have been involved in the constitutional violation must 
generally be named at the outset.47  Additionally, recovering damages from 
the entity is often easier than from individual officers (who may not have 
adequate resources) in cases in which the state does not indemnify its offi-
cers.48 
 
ously liable under Section 1983 for the acts of its employees, entity liability is possible, but 
only where the plaintiff can prove that the unconstitutional act was a result of an unconstitu-
tional policy.  436 U.S. at 691. 
 44. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).  Municipalities, on the other 
hand, can be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of their employees, but only where 
those acts were the result of a municipal policy, practice, or custom.  Monell, 436 U.S. at 
690.  It is, however, notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on these policy-based 
claims.  Denise Gilman, Calling  the United States’ Bluff: How Sovereign Immunity Under-
mines the United States’ Claim to an Effective Domestic Human Rights System, 95 GEO. L.J. 
591, 621 (2007). 
 45. See, e.g., Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007).  To establish supervisory 
liability, a plaintiff must show that the official was either directly involved in committing 
the wrong, that she directed others to commit it, or that she was in a position to prevent the 
wrong and failed to do so.  Id. at 988. 
 46. See Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1988).  Of course, in courts 
that find Congress not to have validly abrogated states’ sovereign immunity with respect to 
Title II, plaintiffs will not be able to sue states and their agencies because they will be enti-
tled to sovereign immunity. 
 47. Courts do allow plaintiffs to allege claims against unnamed defendants or “doe de-
fendants” but most courts require plaintiffs to discover these names before the statute of 
limitations has run.  See Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466, 470 (2d Cir. 
1996), amended by 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir. 1996).  The only circuit to rule that where the 
plaintiff did not know the name of the officer at the time of filing, and later amends the 
complaint to include the officer’s identify after the statute of limitations has run, the com-
plaint is found to relate back to the original filing is the Third Circuit.  See Singletary v. Pa. 
Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 48. Indemnification of state officials is a matter of state law, which varies from state to 
state.  Although state actors are generally indemnified for costs associated with civil rights 
litigation, this is by no means universal, as state laws contain provisions for denying reim-
bursement for various reasons, including the nature of the conduct at issue in the litigation.  
See Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity:  Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 
586 n.12 (1998). 
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B. Advantages of Statutory Claims:  Legal Access 
1. Qualified Immunity 
Qualified immunity is a defense frequently asserted by government offi-
cials performing discretionary functions in civil rights cases brought by 
prisoners.  It shields them from damages liability if their conduct is objec-
tively reasonable in light of clearly established federal law.49  It is meant to 
be asserted and addressed early in litigation so as to avoid the public cost of 
government litigation, and in particular the cost of broad discovery,50 and 
to avoid diverting public officials’ attention from performing their duties 
and toward defending lawsuits.51  As many scholars have noted, qualified 
immunity presents a significant barrier to plaintiffs seeking damages for 
constitutional violations.52  Even in cases in which the court ultimately 
does not grant the defendant qualified immunity, the defense still serves as 
an obstacle to the litigation of a prisoner’s Section 1983 claim because de-
fendants who have been denied qualified immunity by a trial court can tie 
up litigation for long periods of time and significantly delay a plaintiff’s re-
covery by making an interlocutory appeal of that decision.53  Not only 
might an appeal occupy the time and energy of plaintiff’s counsel, but dis-
covery, at least with respect to the defendants asserting qualified immunity, 
is likely to be stayed pending the decision on appeal.54 
While a qualified immunity defense is likely to derail a prisoner’s Sec-
tion 1983 action, it is not an available defense under Title II.  Qualified 
immunity is a personal defense available only to individuals.55  In suits for 
damages under Title II, the proper defendants are public entities, not indi-
 
 49. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 
U.S. 555, 565 (1978)). 
 50. Crawford El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998). 
 51. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)). 
 52. One small study of federal cases showed that the defense of qualified immunity was 
granted in 80% of cases.  See Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 
64 MO. L. REV. 123, 145 n.106 (1999); see also Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of 
Qualified Immunity: How Conflating Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 
34 IDAHO L. REV. 61, 68 (1997) (noting that “qualified immunity has pulled the door to the 
courthouse nearly shut, leaving a crack so thin that only the most battered plaintiffs can still 
squeeze through”). 
 53. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528-30 (1985). 
 54. Because one of the purposes of granting qualified immunity to government officials 
is to allow them to avoid onerous discovery where their conduct was not in violation of 
clearly established law, discovery will almost always be stayed pending a decision on quali-
fied immunity by the district and circuit courts.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (stating that 
“[u]ntil this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed”). 
 55. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). 
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viduals.56  Thus, courts have generally found, and scholars agree, that 
qualified immunity is not available in suits for damages under Title II.57 
2. Attorney’s Fees 
Prisoner litigation changed dramatically with the passage of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act58 (“PLRA”) in 1996.59  According to the statute’s 
sparse legislative history, it was passed to reduce frivolous litigation by 
prisoners and to limit the reach of federal court jurisdiction over prisoners’ 
civil rights claims.60  The PLRA restricts prisoners’ access to the courts 
and, for those prisoners who make it there, impedes their ability to obtain 
relief.61  For example, unlike other indigent civil litigants, the $350 federal 
district court filing fee is not waived for prisoners wishing to proceed in 
forma pauperis.62  The PLRA also contains a stringent requirement that all 
prisoners wishing to challenge the conditions of their confinement exhaust 
all administrative remedies.63  Prisoner litigants who are not barred at the 
courthouse door are subject to the PLRA’s provision barring actions for 
damages for mental or emotional injury in the absence of physical injury.64 
The PLRA’s provisions generally apply to all federal lawsuits brought 
by prisoners, including those raising Title II and Section 504 claims.  How-
 
 56. See, e.g., Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 57. Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2000).  But see, Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 
693, 696-97 (5th Cir. 1999); Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996, 999-1000 (6th Cir. 1999).  Both 
of these decisions granted qualified immunity to defendants in a Title II claim, but neither 
case considered whether individuals can even be proper defendants in the first place. See 
Walker, 213 F.3d at 346; see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitu-
tional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1929 (2007). 
 58. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). 
 59. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2003). 
 60. 141 CONG. REC. S14312-03 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham). 
 61. See John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act, The New Face of Court Strip-
ping, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 429 (2001); Margo Schlanger, The Politics of Inmate Litigation, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2799 (2004); Giovanna Shay, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping and 
Executive Power: Interpreting The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 291 
(2007). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)-(b) (2006). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). 
 64. Id. § 1997e(e).  That prisoners cannot seek damages for mental or emotional injury 
where physical injury is not attendant presents the question of whether a prisoner who was 
denied access to prison programs, services, and activities or who otherwise experienced dis-
crimination by prison officials on the basis of disability who could not show concomitant 
physical injury could even seek damages under the federal disability statutes.  One could 
easily imagine such claims: a deaf prisoner who was denied a sign language interpreter at 
medical appointments and disciplinary hearings or a blind prisoner who was not provided 
legal materials in alternative format. 
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ever, one particular provision—the statute’s restriction on attorneys’ fees—
does not seem to apply to Title II and Section 504 litigation brought by 
prisoners.  While prevailing civil rights plaintiffs are generally able to re-
cover reasonable, market-rate attorney’s fees,65 the PLRA severely restricts 
the fees available to these prisoner-plaintiffs.  Specifically, the statute re-
stricts fees awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to 150% of the Criminal 
Justice Act (“CJA”) rate,66 and states that up to 25% of money judgments 
must be used to satisfy attorneys’ fees claims, and prohibits attorneys’ fees 
awards to defendants greater than 150% of money judgments.67  Although 
a stated purpose of the PLRA is to reduce frivolous prisoner litigation, the 
statute severely restricts the attorneys’ fees that are available to other pre-
vailing civil rights litigants. 
It is not clear why the fees provision does not restrict ADA and Section 
504 litigants, or whether this exclusion is anything more than a drafting 
oversight.  Inexplicably, there is no uniformity in the statutory language 
among the provisions of the PLRA with respect to what types of actions are 
covered by each provision.  For instance, the limitation on recovery for 
mental or emotional injury applies to “federal action[s] brought by a pris-
oner,” whereas the administrative exhaustion provision applies to “action[s] 
brought with respect to prison conditions under Section 1983 . . . or any 
other federal law, by a prisoner . . . .”  Nonetheless, it is clear from the lan-
guage of the statute that these two and most other provisions of the statute 
apply to ADA and Section 504 litigation. 
 
 65. In 1976 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, Pub. L. No. 
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 1988 (2006)), in an effort to in-
crease the likelihood that victims of civil rights violations would be able to seek legal re-
dress.  Section 1988 provides:  “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision [of civil 
rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §1983], the court, in its discretion, may allow the pre-
vailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 
 66. In some jurisdictions, the base rate used to calculate PLRA fees is the rate author-
ized by the Judicial Conference, based on inflation.  See, e.g., Webb v. Ada County, 285 
F.3d 829, 839 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying 150% multiplier to maximum CJA rate, not the 
lower actual rate implemented in the District of Idaho due to lack of congressional funding).  
In other jurisdictions, in which the authorized rate is not actually paid to attorneys due to 
budget shortfalls, the base rate used to calculate the rate for prisoners’ attorneys is the actual 
CJA rate paid to attorneys.  See Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(holding the authorized rate that was not “implemented” due to budgetary constraints was 
not the “established” rate for PLRA purposes); Jackson v. Austin, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 
1064-65 (D. Kan. 2003) (assuming the lower funded rates apply). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2006). The statute also requires fees to be directly and rea-
sonably incurred in proving violation of the plaintiff’s rights and that either the amount of 
the fee was proportionately related to the relief awarded by the court for the violation, or the 
attorney’s fees were incurred in enforcing a court’s order of relief.  Id. 
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The provision limiting attorneys’ fees, however, applies only to actions 
in which “fees are authorized by Section 1988 of [Title 42].”68  42 U.S.C. § 
1988, is the statute authorizing attorneys fees for prevailing plaintiffs under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Prevailing plaintiffs suing under the ADA and Section 
504 are entitled to fees under entirely separate fee provisions.69  Whether or 
not Congress intended for the restrictions on attorneys’ fees to apply in all 
prison conditions cases or simply those brought under Section 1983, it 
seems clear from the language of the statute that ADA and Section 504 liti-
gants are not subject to the PLRA’s fee restrictions.70  Courts that have ad-
dressed this issue have all found that the attorney fee award limitations of 
the PLRA did not limit fee awards to prisoner plaintiffs to the extent that 
such fees were sought under attorney fee provisions of the ADA and Reha-
bilitation Act.71 
The difference in fees available to plaintiffs in cases not restricted by the 
PLRA can be overwhelming, which is a factor that can severely limit a 
prisoner’s ability to retain competent counsel in civil rights cases.72 
3. Expert Fees 
Just as fee-shifting provisions that permit a prevailing civil rights plain-
tiff to recover attorneys’ fees from defendants encourage the private en-
forcement of civil rights laws, so do provisions that similarly require de-
fendants to pay the fees of expert witnesses hired by plaintiffs.  The 
inability to recover the usually steep cost of hiring an expert witness can 
make civil rights cases unappealing and risky to plaintiffs’ counsel.73 Ex-
pert witness presentation is crucial to the success of civil rights cases.74  
Prisoner’s rights cases frequently involve the use of expert testimony.  
Prison security experts are regularly called upon to testify in a variety of 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (ADA fee provision); 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2006) (Section 504 Fee 
Provision). 
 70. The statute applies to “any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 
1988.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
 71. See Armstrong v. Davis, 318 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2003); McClendon v. City of 
Albuquerque, 272 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.M. 2003); Beckford v. Irvin, 60 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 
(W.D.N.Y. 1999); D.M. v. Terhune, 67 F. Supp. 2d 401, 412 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 72. See Lynn Branham, Toothless in Truth?  The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Disparate Restrictions on Attorney’s Fees 89 CAL. L. REV. 
999, 1010 (2001). 
 73. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence:  A Com-
ment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process 
of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 706-07 (1992). 
 74. Id. at 711. 
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types of prisoner suits.  Medical and psychiatric experts are regularly em-
ployed in cases involving inadequate medical and mental health treatment 
for prisoners and in disability rights cases brought by prisoners. 
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act75, the fee-shifting statute 
governing Section 1983 has been interpreted by the Court not to permit 
prevailing plaintiffs to recover fees for expert testimony.76  The ADA, as 
noted above, has its own fee-shifting provision, however.77  The fee shift-
ing provision of the ADA has been interpreted to permit prevailing plain-
tiffs to recover expert fees.78  Given the importance of expert testimony in 
prisoner civil rights cases, this difference between the ADA and constitu-
tional claims brought under Section 1983 is clear.  As mentioned below, 
Section 504 does not permit plaintiffs to recover expert fees. 
4. Punitive Damages 
One advantage to constitutional claims brought under Section 1983 that 
should be acknowledged is that punitive damages are permissible, whereas 
they are held to be unavailable under the disability statutes.  Under Section 
1983, punitive damages are available when the plaintiff shows “reckless or 
callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights.”79  Because this standard has 
significant overlap with the Eighth Amendment standard for compensatory 
liability, punitive damages are actually frequently awarded in cases in 
which prisoners win at trial.80  The Supreme Court has made clear, how-
 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
 76. W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 92 (1991). 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006) (“In any action or administrative proceeding commenced 
pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, 
and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private indi-
vidual.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).  In Lovell, the 
court found that the language of 42 U.S.C. § 12205 had been interpreted in other contexts to 
cover expert fees.  The court also found that the ADA’s regulations and its legislative his-
tory supported its interpretation.  The court noted that the preamble to the ADA Title II 
regulations states that “[l]itigation expenses include items such as expert witness fees, travel 
expenses, etc.”  28 C.F.R. § 35, app. A (2007).  Further, as the Lovell court noted, the 
ADA’s legislative history also makes clear that Congress intended the ADA’s fee shifting 
provision to cover expert fees.  See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 73 (1990), reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 496 (“Litigation expenses include the costs of expert witnesses. 
This provision explicitly incorporates the phrase ‘including litigation expenses’ to respond 
to rulings of the Supreme Court that items such as expert witness fees, travel expenses, etc., 
be explicitly included if intended to be covered under an attorney’s fee provision.”). 
 79. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983). 
 80. See Schlanger, supra note 59, at 1606-07 (attributing the high rate of punitive dam-
ages awards in cases in which prisoners win at trial to the stringent standard for awarding 
prisoner-plaintiffs compensatory damages). 
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ever, that Title II and Section 504 do not allow for punitive damages 
awards.81 
While the federal disability statutes provide significant substantive and 
strategic advantages over traditional constitutional claims to prisoners seek-
ing money damages, the ADA carries with it the separate problem of sov-
ereign immunity.  Section 504, on the other hand, does not present pris-
oner-plaintiffs with this hurdle. 
III.  THE ADA, SECTION 504 AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The ADA has been described as “the most comprehensive civil rights 
measure” passed since the 1960s.82 Congress passed the ADA in 1990 in 
order to address disability-based discrimination in employment (Title I),83 
public services (Title II),84 and public accommodations (Title III).85  As 
scholars and disability rights advocates have pointed out, and as Congress 
has recently recognized, the statute’s goal of providing a “broad scope of 
protection” from disability-based discrimination has been frustrated by the 
courts.86  In passing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Congress specifi-
cally rejected the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the statute with re-
spect to who is considered disabled under the law and engaged in a conver-
sation with the courts about who is meant to be protected by the law.87  
 
 81. Because punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under Title 
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it follows that they may not be awarded in suits brought 
under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  Barnes v. Gorman, 
536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (holding that because the ADA and Section 504 clearly incorpo-
rate the remedies permitted under Title VI, and because punitive damages may not be 
awarded in private suits under Title VI, punitive damages are not permissible under the 
ADA and Section 504). 
 82. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implica-
tions of a Second Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 414 
(1991). 
 83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2006). 
 84. Id. §§ 12131-12165. 
 85. Id. §§ 12181-12189. 
 86. See Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1, 4 (2007); 
 87. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 states as its purpose: 
(2) to reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that whether an im-
pairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with refer-
ence to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures; 
(3) to reject the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
527 U.S. 471 (1999) with regard to coverage under the third prong of the defini-
tion of disability and to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School 
Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) which set forth a broad 
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This bill, which was signed into law by President Bush on September 25, 
2008, will protect a far broader class of people than it has under the current 
judicial interpretations of the law. 
Placing strict limitations on who is considered disabled under the law is 
not the only way in which the courts have thwarted congressional intent 
with respect to the ADA.  In passing the original statute, Congress made 
clear that states “shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution . . . from an action in federal or State court . . . for a violation 
of [the statute].”88  Despite Congress’s explicit abrogation of state sover-
eign immunity, the courts have not uniformly held that people with dis-
abilities are entitled to sue states for damages and the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions on this question have not fully resolved the issue. 
Congress can abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity through legislation 
enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.89  In the last 
decade and a half, the Court has taken a particularly restrictive view of 
Congress’s authority to abrogate states’ immunity by enacting legislating 
pursuant to Section 5. 90  Section 5 empowers Congress to remedy both past 
 
view of the third prong of the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973; 
(4) to reject the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), that the terms 
“substantially” and “major” in the definition of disability under the ADA “need to 
be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled,” 
and that to be substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the 
ADA “an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts 
the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's 
daily lives”; 
(5) to convey congressional intent that the standard created by the Supreme Court 
in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 
184 (2002) for “substantially limits,” and applied by lower courts in numerous de-
cisions, has created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain 
coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is the intent of Congress that the pri-
mary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether enti-
ties covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey 
that the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the 
ADA should not demand extensive analysis; and 
(6) to express Congress’ expectation that the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission will revise that portion of its current regulations that defines the term 
“substantially limits” as “significantly restricted” to be consistent with this Act, 
including the amendments made by this Act. 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2006). 
 89. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996). 
 90. The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to bar suits by private individuals 
against states when their sovereign immunity has not been waived or abrogated.  The Su-
preme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe marks the beginning of its restrictive view of 
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violations of constitutional rights as well as to enact “prophylactic legisla-
tion” that prohibits constitutionally permissible conduct in order to deter 
unconstitutional conduct.  The Court is often divided over the extent of 
Congress’s authority to abrogate states’ immunity with respect to conduct 
that is itself not violative of Section 5; the ADA has been central to this de-
bate.91 
The Supreme Court first addressed state sovereign immunity in the ADA 
context in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment barred damages actions against states for 
damages brought under Title I of the ADA.92  In Garrett, the Court found 
that there was not sufficient history of a pattern of unconstitutional em-
ployment discrimination by the states and that the statutory response was 
not proportional to the violations.93  The Garrett Court specifically left 
open the question of whether Congress had validly abrogated state sover-
eign immunity in enacting Title II of the ADA.94  Nonetheless, many lower 
courts relied on Garrett to find that Congress did not validly abrogate sov-
ereign immunity in enacting Title II.95 
The Title II question had the disability legal community and state attor-
neys general waiting on pins and needles for several years96 before the Su-
 
Congress’s power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.  There, the Court held that Con-
gress’s power to abrogate sovereign immunity was limited to its efforts to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment.  A year later, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court imposed significant 
limitations on the Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that 
Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment are limited to enforcing 
its actual substantive guarantees.  In order for legislation to be a valid exercise of congres-
sional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must make specific findings 
that the states have violated the Constitution.  Even if those findings are made, the resulting 
legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment must be congruent and proportional to the 
harm sought to be prevented.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).  For a 
discussion of the Court’s restrictive views on abrogation of sovereign immunity, see Re-
becca E. Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox:  The Spending Power and the Waiver of Sovereign 
Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 157-58 (2002); see also Jaclyn A. Okin, Has the 
Supreme Court Gone Too Far?:  An Analysis of University of Alabama v. Garrett and Its 
Impact on People with Disabilities, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 663, 689 (2001). 
 91. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006) (acknowledging split amongst 
the members of the Court concerning Congress’s enforcement power). 
 92. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). 
 93. Id. at 372-73. 
 94. Id. at n.1. 
 95. See, e.g., Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 981-83 (5th Cir. 2001); Thompson 
v. Colorado, 258 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2001), amended by 278 F.3d 1020, 1034 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
 96. The Court had actually granted certiorari to address the Title II question three times 
prior to Garrett.  See Med. Bd. v. Hason, cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1028 (2002), cert. dis-
missed on motion of petitioner, 538 U.S. 958 (2003); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1 (dismiss-
ing as improvidently granted that portion of the writ of certiorari addressing Title II); Als-
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preme Court granted certiorari in Tennessee v. Lane in 2003.  At this point 
the circuits were deeply divided, with five of them holding that Congress 
had exceeded its authority in enacting Title II,97 three of them holding that 
at least in some respects, Congress properly abrogated the states’ immu-
nity,98 and with petitions pending in the remaining four circuits.99 
In Lane, the Court chose to address the question of whether Congress 
was within its authority to enact Title II on an as-applied basis, and held 
that Title II was validly enacted pursuant to Section 5 with respect to the 
fundamental right of access to courts.100  Having avoided the question of 
whether Congress validly abrogated states’ immunity with respect to Title 
II as a whole, the fate of prisoner damages actions under the ADA was still 
up in the air after Lane. 
In the aftermath of Lane, few courts addressed its impact on Title II 
cases brought by prisoners101 before the Court granted certiorari a year later 
in another Title II case, this one brought by a prisoner.102  In United States 
v. Georgia, the plaintiff, Tony Goodman—who had paraplegia and used a 
wheelchair for mobility—alleged that he was held in a Georgia prison for 
more than twnety-three hours a day in a cell so narrow that he could not 
turn his wheelchair.  He further claimed that prison toilet and bathing facili-
 
brook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. granted and cert. 
dismissed, (dismissed by agreement of the parties); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Tennessee v. Lane, 539 U.S. 941 (2003) (No. 02-1667). 
 97. See Wessel v. Glendening, 306 F.3d 203, 215 (4th Cir. 2002); Randolph v. Rodgers, 
253 F.3d 342, 345 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2001); Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1034 (10th 
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002); Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 983 
(5th Cir. 2001); Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
1190 (2001). 
 98. See Hason v. Med. Bd., 279 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 
U.S. 958 (2003); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Ct., 276 F.3d 808, 813-16 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 99. See Goodman v. Ray, 449 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2006); Barbour v. WMATA, 374 
F.3d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 332 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2003), va-
cated by 332 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. Jun 13, 2003); Bowers v. NCAA, 346 F.3d 402 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
 100. 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004). 
 101. Three circuits addressed the issue in this period.  The Third Circuit held that Con-
gress did not validly abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity where the issue at stake was a 
prisoner’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause.  See Cochran v. Pinchak, 401 F.3d 184, 
193 (3d Cir. 2005), vacated by Cochran v. Pinchak, 412 F.3d 500 (3rd Cir. 2005).  The 
Eleventh Circuit similarly held that abrogation was not valid where the issue at stake was a 
prisoner’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.  See Miller v. King, 449 F.3d 
1149 (11th Cir. 2006).  The Ninth Circuit held that its pre-Lane holding that Title II in its 
entirety was validly enacted pursuant to Section 5 and thus that Congress validly abrogated 
sovereign immunity as to all of Title II remained good law after Lane.  See Phiffer v. Co-
lumbia River Corr. Inst. 384 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 102. Goodman v. Georgia, 544 U.S. 1031 (2005). 
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ties were not accessible to him such that he was forced to sit in his own fe-
ces and urine, and that he was excluded from prison educational and reli-
gious programs because of his disability.103  The Court’s decision in Mr. 
Goodman’s case was unusual amongst its recent Eleventh Amendment de-
cisions in that it was unanimous.  The Court relied on the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s finding that Mr. Goodman had properly alleged constitutional claims 
to hold that Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity where the 
conduct at issue actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment.104  The Court 
found that the Eleventh Circuit was wrong to have dismissed those Title II 
claims that were also valid constitutional claims, but did not address the vi-
ability of Title II claims that were not also valid claims under the Four-
teenth Amendment.105 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Georgia leaves open 
the question about the viability of Title II claims challenging conduct that 
does not also violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court’s decision in 
Lane makes clear that such claims will be decided on an as-applied basis.  
Thus, it is wholly likely that whether prisoners will be barred from raising 
Title II claims that do not also constitute violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment will remain unsettled for some time.  This is evident in look-
ing at the decisions of lower courts after United States v. Georgia.  None of 
the circuits have yet decided the question of Congress’ prophylactic reach 
with respect to prisoners’ claims under the ADA.  In those circuits in which 
the issue has arisen, one  court remanded to the district court,106 which then 
avoided the issue,107 and another did not address it after the plaintiff took a 
voluntary dismissal of his ADA claims.108  The district courts that have de-
cided the issue have either held that Congress did not validly abrogate state 
sovereign immunity with respect to Title II claims concerning conduct not 
violative of the Constitution,109 or have avoided the question by finding 
 
 103. 546 U.S. 151, 155 (2006). 
 104. Id. at 159. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 107. See Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., No. 01-CV-134, 2007 WL 2247843 (D.N.H Aug. 
1, 2007). 
 108. See Spencer v. Earley, No. 07-6460, 2008 WL 2076429 (4th Cir. May 16, 2008). 
 109. While some courts have come to this conclusion by employing the City of Boerne 
test to determine whether Title II was a congruent and proportional response to a history of 
disability-based discrimination against prisoners, see, e.g., Chase v. Baskerville, 508 F. 
Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Va. 2007); Perry v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:05CV1384, 2007 WL 
892460 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2007), others have simply, and wrongly, cited United States v. 
Georgia for the proposition that sovereign immunity is only abrogated under Title II in 
cases where defendants’ conduct violates the constitution.  See, e.g., Fox v. Poole, No. 06-
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that the conduct challenged by plaintiffs also violates the Constitution.110  
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Georgia, no federal 
court has ruled that prisoners can bring Title II damages claims based on 
conduct that does not violate the Constitution. 
Courts address the issue of whether Congress validly abrogated state 
sovereign immunity in enacting Section 504 almost identically as they do 
with respect to the ADA.111  However, abrogation is not the only way 
around the Eleventh Amendment for Section 504 litigants.  Section 504, 
which requires agencies receiving federal funds to refrain from disability-
based discrimination, was enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause au-
thority in addition to its authority under Section 5.112  States’ ongoing ac-
ceptance of federal funds waives the Eleventh Amendment defense to Re-
habilitation Act claims.113  Almost every circuit to have addressed the 
question of whether states accepting federal funds are subject to suit under 
Section 504 has found that the states’ waiver of immunity is valid.114  The 
Second Circuit is the only court to have held otherwise, but limited its rul-
ing such that it found the states’ waiver invalid only during a particular 
 
CV-148, 2008 WL 1867939, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008); Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F. 
Supp. 2d 1028, 1037 (D. Ariz. 2007). 
 110. See, e.g., Lamzot v. Phillips, No. 04 CIV. 6719, 2006 WL 686578 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
16, 2006); Degrafinreid v. Ricks, 417 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 111. See, e.g., Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 205 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 112. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2006). 
 113. In 1985, the Supreme Court held that Section 504 did not adequately make clear 
Congress’ intent to condition federal funding on a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity  See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245-246 (1985).  Congress en-
acted 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2006), part of the Rehabilitation Amendments Act, in response 
to the Court’s decision in Atascadero.  It provides, in relevant part: 
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act . . . . 
(2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in paragraph 
(I), remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such 
a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation 
in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State. 
§ 2000d-7(a). 
 114. Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 
2005); Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 
Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 2003 WL 21078049 (9th Cir. May 14, 2003); Garrett v. Univ. of 
Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003); Koslow v. Pennsyl-
vania, 302 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2002); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 269 F.3d (6th Cir. 
2001); Stanley v. Litcher, 213 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 2000); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 
1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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time period.115  This limitation has allowed several courts within the Sec-
ond Circuit to hold a state’s waiver of immunity to be valid outside of the 
time period described by the circuit’s decision. 
United States v. Georgia has left open the question of whether prisoner 
plaintiffs can seek damages from state officials for violations of the ADA, 
where the conduct in question does not also violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Given that Section 504 does not place this sovereign immu-
nity hurdle before plaintiffs, the question of the whether the ADA confers 
any rights upon prisoners that its predecessor statute does not becomes sig-
nificant. 
IV.  TITLE II AND SECTION 504:  A COMPARISON 
Under Title II, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the bene-
fits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be sub-
jected to discrimination by any such entity.”116  In 1973. Congress passed 
the Rehabilitation Act prohibiting discrimination against people with dis-
abilities “under any program or activity receiving federal financial assis-
tance.”117 
As predicted shortly after the ADA took effect, the differences between 
the two statutes exist more in theory than in practice.118  Courts have con-
sistently found that the substantive provisions of the ADA are coextensive 
 
 115. In Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center, the Second Circuit found that the lan-
guage of Section 504 clearly expressed Congress’s intent to condition the acceptance of fed-
eral funds on the states’ waiver of immunity.  280 F.3d 98, 113 (2d Cir. 2001).  However, 
the court held that New York’s waiver had not been “knowing” during the time period when 
the dispute in Garcia arose.  Id. at 114-15.  That time period was between the effective date 
of the ADA (1992) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Garrett (2001), holding that at least 
in some contexts, Congress’s abrogation of sovereign immunity was not valid.  Id.  The 
Second Circuit reasoned that because the language of the ADA made clear that Congress 
intended to abrogate immunity, “a state accepting conditioned federal funds could not have 
understood that in doing so it was actually abandoning its sovereign immunity from private 
damages suits [because] by all reasonable appearances, state sovereign immunity had al-
ready been lost.”  Id. at 114.  Because the question of whether Congress validly abrogated 
states’ immunity with respect to the ADA has been unresolved at least since the Garrett de-
cisions, most courts interpreting the Second Circuit’s decision in Garcia have held the 
state’s waiver to be valid.  Thus, the effect of Garcia is minimal to the extent that the Title 
II question remains unanswered or to the extent that the Court finds abrogation invalid. 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006). 
 117. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). 
 118. Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Re-
lationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089, 1109-12 (1995). 
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with those of Section 504 and have tended to analyze the claims as one.119  
Thus it will often be the case that prisoner litigants can choose to pursue 
their damages claims under Section 504 and not under the ADA without a 
fear that their claims will be dismissed or delayed because defendants move 
to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds.  However, some differences be-
tween the statutes do exist, and in some subset of prisoners’ rights cases, 
Section 504 may not be an adequate substitute for the ADA. 
A. Federal Financial Assistance 
The most obvious and well recognized difference between the two stat-
utes is Section 504’s requirement that a covered entity receive federal fi-
nancial assistance.  In fact this difference was one of the statue’s key short-
falls that precipitated the movement to push for a more comprehensive 
statute in the ADA.120  While this limitation of Section 504 will certainly 
be an impediment to addressing disability-based discrimination by some 
private and state actors,121 it will rarely limit the ability of prisoner litigants 
to challenge their treatment by state prison authorities. 
All state departments of corrections receive federal financial assistance 
and as such are subject to the anti-discrimination provisions of Section 
504.122  Section 504 prohibits disability-based discrimination by “any pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance”123 and defines “pro-
gram or activity” to include all of the operations of a state agency.124  
Therefore, all that is necessary for a state department of corrections to be 
covered by the statute is for it to receive some federal funding.  Courts have 
agreed that as long as a state’s department of corrections receives federal 
monies, regardless of whether those funds were earmarked for programs 
designed to further the anti-discrimination purpose of Section 504, it is 
properly governed by the statute.125 
 
 119. Bennett v. Dominguez, 196 Fed. App’x 785, 791 (11th Cir. 2006); Iverson v. City of 
Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 2006); Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 
1998); Allison v. Dep’t of Corr., 94 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1996); Vande Zande v. Wis. 
Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 120. See Burgdorf, Jr., supra note 82, 430-31, 431 n. 94. 
 121. See Katie Eyer, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 282 
(2005). 
 122. According to state budget documents, fifty states’ prison systems receive federal 
funding (on file with author). 
 123. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). 
 124. Id. § 794(b). 
 125. Some departments of corrections (and other agencies) have argued that they are not 
subject to Section 504 because the federal money that they receive is not related to the goals 
of the statute.  They argue that under the Supreme Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Dole, 
483 U.S. 203 (1987), conditions attached to Spending Clause legislation are only valid if 
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B. Causation 
Another potential difference between the statutes themselves is in the 
causation standards.  Section 504 prohibits discrimination “solely by reason 
of” disability,126 whereas Title II prohibits discrimination “by reason of 
such disability.”127  According to Title II’s legislative history, Congress 
omitted the word “solely” from the causation language of Title II because 
“literal reliance on the phrase ‘solely by reason of his or her handicap’ 
leads to absurd results,” such as permitting under the statute discrimination 
based on both race and disability.128  Although there is evidence that Con-
gress did not intend for these phrases to result in a difference in the causa-
tion standards that apply in Title II and Section 504 cases,129 some courts 
have held that they must. 
These courts have held that under Section 504, disability must be the 
only basis for discrimination, but that under Title II, disability may simply 
be a motivating factor for the discrimination.130  Other courts have applied 
the “solely by reason of disability” causation standard to both Title II and 
Section 504 claims, reasoning that the statute itself and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the statute require the two schemes to be inter-
preted consistently, but failing to account for the fact that Congress omitted 
the word “solely” from the language of Title II.131  Nonetheless, the major-
 
they are unambiguous and reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure and, if the 
expenditure is for the general welfare and the legislation does not violate any independent 
constitutional prohibition.  483 U.S at 207-08.  However, all of the five federal circuits to 
have addressed this issue have held that a state agency that accepts federal financial assis-
tance waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity and is subject to Section 504 even if those 
federal funds are not earmarked for programs that address the goals of the statute.  See 
Miller v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 421 F.3d 342, 348 -50 (5th Cir. 2005); Barbour 
v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Lovell v. Chan-
dler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir.2002); Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2002); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 126. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006). 
 128. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 85 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 368. 
 129. Weber, supra note 118, at 1110-11; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 85-86 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 368. 
 130. See, e.g., New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 301 
(3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that the two statutes are “significantly dissimilar” with respect to 
the “causative link between discrimination and adverse action” and thus finding that the 
“solely by reason of disability” language  applies only in Section 504 and not Title II cases 
(quoting Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999))); Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, 
Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 131. In Zukle v. Regents of the University of California, the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta 
that courts should apply the same analysis to claims under both statutes, relying on the lan-
guage of 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2006), which states that “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights 
set forth in [the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights [applicable 
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ity of circuits have found that the causation standards of the statutes do dif-
fer from one another, based on the plain meaning of the statutory language. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the more stringent causation 
standard of Section 504 is reason to always plead claims under both the 
ADA and Section 504.  There are likely many prisoner cases in which the 
plaintiff’s prospects of success would be the same under both statutes.  
Many prisoners’ claims under the ADA or Section 504 are premised on the 
prison system’s failure to provide reasonable modifications.  In such cases, 
the causation standard is generally not at issue.  The statutes place an af-
firmative obligation on prison authorities to provide reasonable accommo-
dations where necessary to permit a prisoner with a disability access to its 
programs, services, and activities.132  Although prison officials may be en-
titled to assert a defense to excuse them from providing accommoda-
tions,133 causation is not a part of the inquiry into whether the accommoda-
tion is reasonable.134  Furthermore, relatively few Title II claims are 
premised on a disparate treatment theory, and when they are, the result 
would generally not differ based on which statute’s causation standard ap-
plied.135  Finally, no reported decisions demonstrate a court relying on the 
differences in the causation standards to allow a prisoner’s ADA claim to 
go forward, but not her Section 504 claim.  In these cases, courts often ac-
knowledge the differing standards when reciting the elements of Title II 
and Section 504 claims, but do not address the difference in the analysis of 
the prisoner’s claims under the statutes.136  Thus, it appears unlikely that 
 
to ADA claims]” and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 
(1998), finding that courts must “construe the ADA to grant at least as much protection as 
provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act.”  166 F.3d 1041, 1045 
n.11 (9th Cir. 1999).  However, in a more recent case that involved Title I of the ADA, 
which prohibits disability-based employment discrimination, the Ninth Circuit—without 
reference to Zukle—found that the “motivating factor” standard is the appropriate causation 
standard under all liability provisions of the ADA.  See Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 
1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2006). 
 133. The defendant may assert that despite the plaintiff’s need for the accommodation, 
providing it would impose an “undue financial or administrative burdens” or would require 
a “fundamental alteration in the nature of the program.”  See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. 
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 n.17 (1987) (quoting Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410, 
412 (1979)). 
 134. See Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005) (rec-
ognizing that the causation standards of Title II and Section 504 are different, but finding 
that the inquiry into whether the requested accommodations were to be afforded would be 
the same under both statutes precisely because causation is not at issue in such claims). 
 135.  Eyer, supra note 121, at 301. 
 136. See, e.g., Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6 (11th Cir. 
2008). 
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courts would treat prisoner Title II claims differently from prisoner Section 
504 with respect to the causation standard.137 
C. Expert Fees 
One advantage that prisoners litigating under the ADA may have over 
Section 504 litigants is that prevailing plaintiffs under the ADA may be en-
titled to expert fees.  As stated in Part II.B.3 above, the ADA’s attorneys’ 
fees provision has been held to permit recovery of expert fees.  This is not 
so with respect to Section 504.  Because Section 504 incorporates “the 
remedies, procedures and rights” of Title VI, and because Title VI has been 
interpreted not to permit recovery of expert fees, courts may not be willing 
to award expert fees to Section 504 plaintiffs.138 
D. Regulations 
Because the anti-discrimination provisions of Title II and Section 504 
are so minimal, the question of their differences must also focus on the 
statutes’ regulations.  This question is somewhat complicated by the fact 
that there are several agencies responsible for the Section 504 regulations, 
and by the fact that Title II’s regulations are currently in the process of be-
ing amended.  The focus here will be on differences between the standards 
that might lead to an interpretation of Title II as more protective of a dis-
abled prisoner’s rights than Section 504, such that the prisoner might think 
twice before abandoning ADA claims in an effort to avoid the Eleventh 
Amendment problem. 
The conduct prohibited by both Title II and Section 504, as well as the 
affirmative obligations they impose on government agencies, and the de-
fenses available to those agencies, are laid out in the implementing regula-
tions.139  These regulations are substantially similar, however, some differ-
ences exist between the two sets of regulations currently in operation, and 
perhaps even more significant differences for prisoner plaintiffs between 
 
 137. But see Eyer, supra note 121, at 302 & n.168 (warning that courts could treat claims 
under Title II and Section 504 differently with respect to causation if those courts relied on 
pre-ADA interpretations of Section 504, which relied heavily on the stringent causation 
standard). 
 138. See, e.g., M.P., ex rel. K.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No., 2007 WL 844688, at *3-4 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 16, 2007) (“The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the ‘remedies, procedures, and 
rights” of Title VI in cases brought under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”); see also 
29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (2006); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002).  A Title VI 
plaintiff can recover attorney fees, but not expert fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)-(c) (2006).  
Moreover, the Rehabilitation Act does not state that expert fees are available as part of an 
award of attorney fees.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (denying expert fees). 
 139. 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2008); 28 C.F.R. § 41 (2008). 
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the new proposed Title II rules and the regulations implementing Section 
504. 
As one author has noted, while the regulations implementing the two 
statutes differ with respect to the reasonable accommodation duty, affirma-
tive defenses, standards for communication, and program accessibility, 
these differences are unlikely to be of great significance to litigants.140  The 
Title II regulations require state entities to provide reasonable modifica-
tions unless doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the pro-
gram.141  While no such duty or defense exists in the Section 504 regula-
tions, both the duty and defense were well established by pre-ADA case 
law and are thus unlikely to be a source of difference in courts’ interpreta-
tions of the statutes.142 
Another difference between the two sets of regulations concern their 
mandates to ensure effective communication with people with disabili-
ties.143  The ADA regulations are more detailed, and require that public en-
tities ensure that communication with people with disabilities is as effective 
as it is with others and provide auxiliary aids and services to afford people 
with disabilities an equal opportunity to participate in the entity’s pro-
grams.144  Section 504’s regulations, on the other hand, are far less specific 
and contain no requirement that communication with people with disabili-
ties must be as effective as with others or that it must afford equal participa-
tion in the agency’s services.145  Based solely on their text, it would seem 
that the Title II regulations would provide far greater protection to the dis-
abled with respect to communication-related claims.  Courts, however, 
have found no difference in this area, either applying the ADA standards to 
 
 140. See Eyer, supra note 121. 
 141. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2008) (“A public entity shall make reasonable modifica-
tions in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid dis-
crimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making 
the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activ-
ity.”). 
 142. See Eyer, supra note 121, at 304. 
 143. Id. at 305. 
 144. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (2008) (providing that “[a] public entity shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants and members of the public 
with disabilities are as effective as communications with others” and that “[a] public entity 
shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an individual 
with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, 
program, or activity conducted by a public entity”). 
 145. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(e) (2008) (“Recipients shall take appropriate steps to ensure that 
communications with their applicants, employees, and beneficiaries are available to persons 
with impaired vision and hearing.”). 
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Section 504 claims, or determining that the Section 504 standards provide 
the same rights as the ADA’s.146 
Given that the Department of Justice is likely to amend the Title II regu-
lations soon,147 it is also important to examine the proposed new rules, at 
least as they differ from the Section 504 regulations, and as they are likely 
to apply to prisons and jails.  Most notable is the proposal to add to the Ti-
tle II regulations a section devoted solely to detention and correctional fa-
cilities.148  The Department of Justice issued this proposal in response to 
 
 146. See Eyer, supra note 121, at 305 (citing Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 324 
n.9 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying Title II communications standards to both ADA and Section 
504 communications claims)); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 
2001); Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F. Supp. 2d 863, 867-70 (S.D. Ohio 2002); 
McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1273 (M.D. Ala. 2001), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 2003 WL 23518420 (11th Cir. 2003); Estate of Alcalde v. 
Deaton Specialty Hosp. Home Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 702, 707-08 (D. Md. 2001); Hanson v. 
Sangamon County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 991 F. Supp. 1059, 1062 n.2 (C.D. Ill. 1998); Ferguson 
v. City of Phoenix, 931 F. Supp. 688, 697 (D. Ariz. 1996), aff’d 157 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 
1998); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 454-56 (9th Cir. 1996); Proctor v. Prince George’s 
Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 826-27 (D. Md. 1998) (relying in part on ADA communica-
tions regulations in evaluating Section 504 claim). 
 147. The Department of Justice issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend 28 
CFR Part 35:  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government 
Services in the Federal Register on June 17, 2008.  73 Fed. Reg. 34,466 (June 17, 2008).  
However, immediately after President Obama took office, his administration directed all 
executive agencies, including the Department of Justice, to defer publication of any new 
regulations until the new administration had the opportunity to review them.  DOJ’s draft 
final rules amending the Title II regulations were among those placed on hold.  See 
http://www.ada.gov/ADAregswithdraw09.htm (last visited June 8, 2009). 
 148. Id.  The following is the text of the proposed new rule: 
§ 35.152 Detention and correctional facilities. 
(a) General.  Public entities that are responsible for the operation or management 
of detention and correctional facilities, either directly or through contracts or other 
arrangements, shall comply with this section. 
(b) Discrimination prohibited. 
(1) Public entities shall ensure that qualified inmates or detainees with disabilities 
shall not, because that facility is inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with 
disabilities, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of the ser-
vices, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 
by any public entity unless the public entity can demonstrate that the required ac-
tions would result in a fundamental alteration or undue burden. 
(2) Public entities shall ensure that inmates or detainees with disabilities are 
housed in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individuals. 
Unless the public entity can demonstrate that it is appropriate to make an excep-
tion for a specific individual, a public entity- 
(i) Should not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in inappropriate security 
classifications because no accessible cells or beds are available; 
(ii) Should not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in designated medical 
areas unless they are actually receiving medical care or treatment; 
GINSBERG_CHRISTENSEN 6/15/2009  12:44:32 PM 
742 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
the numerous complaints it receives from disabled prisoners who are not 
provided with accessible cells, and has found through its investigations and 
compliance reviews a serious lack of available cells, showers, and toilets 
accessible to prisoners with disabilities.149 
An Examination of a few of the provisions of the proposed rules indi-
cates the possibility of a wider gap developing between Title II and Section 
504.  For instance, the proposed rules prohibit prison officials from denying 
access to any of its programs, services, or other activities because a particu-
lar facility is inaccessible, unless providing access would constitute a fun-
damental alteration or undue burden.150  This is significant because many 
prisons provide certain programs or services in a small number or even one 
facility, and if that facility is inaccessible to a person with a disability, he or 
she might be prohibited from participating in the program.  The rules fur-
ther provide specific guidance to prisons on how to achieve the ADA’s in-
tegration mandate, by prohibiting prisons from: (a) housing a prisoner in a 
higher security area than he would otherwise be housed because of a lack 
of accessible cells at the appropriate security level; (b) placing prisoners 
with disabilities in facilities that do not offer the same programs as the 
prison where they would ordinarily be housed; (c) from housing a prisoner 
in a medical facility if not receiving medical treatment; and (d) from being 
housed further from her family than he would ordinarily be housed because 
of a lack of accessible cells.  This specific integration mandate would be 
significant and important, given that prisons regularly deny prisoners with 
 
(iii) Should not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in facilities that do not 
offer the same programs as the facilities where they would ordinarily be housed; 
and 
(iv) Should not deprive inmates or detainees with disabilities of visitation with 
family members by placing them in distant facilities where they would not other-
wise be housed. 
(c) Alterations to detention and correctional facilities.  Alterations to jails, pris-
ons, and other detention and correctional facilities will comply with the require-
ments of § 35.151(b). However, when alterations are made to specific cells, deten-
tion and correctional facility operators may satisfy their obligation to provide the 
required number of cells with mobility features by providing the required mobility 
features in substitute cells (i.e., cells other than those where alterations are origi-
nally planned), provided that each substitute cell- 
(1) Is located within the same facility; 
(2) Is integrated with other cells to the maximum extent feasible; and 
(3) Has, at a minimum, equal physical access as the altered cells to areas used by 
inmates or detainees for visitation, dining, recreation, educational programs, 
medical services, work programs, religious services, and participation in other 
programs that the facility offers to inmates or detainees. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.152(b)(1), 73 Fed. Reg. 34,466 (June 17, 2008). 
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disabilities access to programs, house them in more restrictive conditions 
than their classification or medical condition warrants, and deny them op-
portunities to be housed in prisons closer to home because of the lack of 
accessible cells dispersed throughout a system.  The regulations imple-
menting Section 504 contain nothing similar to these proposed new rules 
(or to many of the other proposed rules).  This may mean that if the new 
rules are adopted, courts will begin to interpret the statutes differently in 
cases brought by prisoners.  Courts may, however, rely on past precedent 
and regulations mandating co-extensive interpretation of the statutes as 
they have done when presented with differing regulations.151 
Another potentially significant change to the Title II regulations would 
adopt Section 35.151(c), which proposes to adopt Parts I and III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and Architectural Barriers Act Guide-
lines152 as the ADA Standards for Accessible Design.153  Title II currently 
allows public entities the choice between two sets of design standards, the 
Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards154 (“UFAS”) or the ADA Acces-
sibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities155 (“ADAAG”).  The Sec-
tion 504 regulations reference the UFAS, but allow for other standards if 
they provide equal or better access.156  UFAS are generally regarded as less 
stringent than ADAAG.157  The standards are quite technical, and it is be-
yond the scope of this Article to determine in what ways they are more or 
less stringent than the Section 504 design standards.158  Whether the ADA 
will provide greater accessibility with respect to design and construction 
will likely depend on the particular element and standard at issue in a given 
case. 
 
 151. See supra note 118. 
 152. 69 Fed. Reg. 44,084 (July 23, 2004). 
 153. Both statutes have standards for accessible design that require covered facilities con-
structed after their respective enactment dates to be fully accessible to people with disabili-
ties.  Some of these standards apply to alterations to covered facilities as well. 
 154. 41 C.F.R. pt. 101-19.6 app. A (2008). 
 155. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A (2008). 
 156. 45 C.F.R. § 84.23(c) (2008). 
 157. Weber, supra note 118, at 1133. 
 158. According to the Department of Justice, the Access Board, the agency responsible 
for developing the new standards, identified ways in which these standards were substan-
tially different from the current standards.  Some of these differences were categorized as 
“reduced cost requirements” which “include those for which the scoping or technical speci-
fications for newly constructed or altered facilities have been made less stringent, or where 
new exceptions have been provided.”  Americans with Disabilities Act Website, ADAAG 
Background, http://www.ada.gov/NPRM2008/ria_2.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).  Thus, 
it is likely that the new standards will be both more and less stringent than the current stan-
dards. 
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V.  OUT WITH THE NEW? 
Given the strategic advantages and disadvantages of bringing constitu-
tional versus statutory claims and the few differences between the ADA 
and Section 504, it will not always be obvious what advocates, litigants and 
judges should do with this information.  A talented and well-respected civil 
rights lawyer once described drafting a complaint in a prisoner civil rights 
suit to me as “throwing [expletive] at the wall and waiting to see what 
sticks.”  It is common for civil rights lawyers to take a kitchen-sink ap-
proach to complaint drafting, including every potentially viable cause of 
action in the hope that after defenses concerning standing, various immuni-
ties, administrative exhaustion, and others are raised and ruled upon, there 
will not be a cause of action remaining.  This is not a matter of careless 
lawyers not taking the time to think through their clients’ claims, but rather 
a sense among these advocates that they are engaging in an uphill battle 
and need to harness every weapon available.  In prisoners’ rights litigation 
in particular, success rates for plaintiffs are exceedingly low,159 and getting 
beyond motions to dismiss is a difficult feat unto itself. 
Nonetheless, I urge advocates to rethink this approach with respect to 
disability rights claims brought on behalf of prisoners, as paring down their 
claims may better serve their clients.  First, with respect to whether to bring 
constitutional claims in addition to statutory claims, thought must be given 
to what constitutional claims may add in a particular case.  Most impor-
tantly, they may add causes of action not covered by the disability statutes, 
such claims for inadequate medical treatment under the Eighth Amend-
ment.  Even where bringing constitutional claims is necessary to cover all 
of the plaintiff’s causes of action, it would be useful to make clear in plead-
ings that the constitutional causes of action are only brought with respect to 
some of the challenged conduct in an effort to avoid unnecessary satellite 
litigation, such as a motion to dismiss for qualified immunity that would 
only be germane to the constitutional claims, or ensure maximum attor-
neys’ fees.160  In addition to adding new causes of action, constitutional 
claims may have some expressive value, even where they do not contribute 
legally to the pleadings.  In cases in which prison officials have engaged in 
particularly egregious behavior, alleging constitutional violations may send 
a stronger message to the court, public, and opposing parties than would a 
claim solely under the disability statutes. 
 
 159.  Schlanger, supra note 59.  In this empirical analysis of inmate litigation in federal 
courts, the author found that the success rate for civil cases brought by prisoners in federal 
court to be less than 15%. 
 160. In cases in which both ADA claims and Eighth Amendment claims were raised, 
courts have apportioned. 
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Finally, advocates should question whether the case is one in which pu-
nitive damages are likely, and if so, whether a jury is likely to award them 
to this particular plaintiff, or whether a request for, or a threat of punitive 
damages is likely to provide a settlement advantage. 
In addition to questioning whether to bring constitutional claims along 
with their statutory claims, advocates should give serious consideration to 
bringing their claims solely under Section 504 and leaving out Title II 
claims entirely.  First, advocates should assess whether the case is analo-
gous to United States v. Georgia, in that all of the conduct forming the ba-
sis for the plaintiff’s complaint violates not only the statutes but the Four-
teenth Amendment.  If so, there would be no disadvantage to raising ADA 
as well as Section 504 claims because in these situations it is clear that 
states are not entitled to sovereign immunity.161  However, in many cases it 
would be nearly impossible to determine with confidence whether a court 
would find that there is the necessary overlap between the statutes and the 
Constitution.  Given the stringent standards by which prisoners’ constitu-
tional claims are granted, this strategy could prove risky in many cases. 
Further, thought should be given to whether the facts of the case bring 
any cause for concern that the more onerous causation standard of Section 
504 is likely to factor into the plaintiff’s chances for success or whether a 
particular court has shown greater tendencies toward assigning great sig-
nificance to the difference in causation standards.  Additionally, given that 
Section 504 does not provide for recovery of expert fees, it may be impor-
tant to assess the role that expert witness presentation might play in the 
case. 
Finally, attention should be paid to the regulations.  Is one of the ADA 
regulations that is different from the section 504 regulations significantly 
implicated by the case?  If so, is a court likely to find that, given statutory 
language and case law about the need to interpret these statutes consis-
tently, the regulation does not apply in the section 504 context?  The im-
portance of this question will depend greatly upon whether the Department 
of Justice adopts the new proposed regulations implementing Title II. 
One reason to include ADA claims that are unrelated to the differences 
between the statutes is precisely to address the sovereign immunity prob-
lem head on.  Lawyer and client may decide that the risk of protracted liti-
gation is worth an effort to try to shape the law on sovereign immunity with 
respect to Title II.  Some advocates (presumably with their client’s bless-
ing) may wish to forge ahead to make sure to make sure that Title II re-
mains available to prisoner litigants whose claims under Section 504 are 
 
 161. See supra notes 23-25 (discussing United States v. Georgia). 
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weaker or who cannot fall back on the predecessor statute at all.  Although 
all state prison systems receive federal financial assistance, many sheriff 
departments are hybrid state and municipal entities and may be less likely 
to receive federal funding than state prison systems.  It may be seen as im-
portant to find good test cases so that the ADA is available in these circum-
stances. 
A mid-way position is also available to litigants and advocates.  In cases 
in which the advocate and client decide to proceed under both statutes ei-
ther because of one of the above-mentioned distinctions or simply out of 
discomfort with giving up a potentially viable claim, the advocate should 
attempt to persuade the court to decline to decide the sovereign immunity 
question based on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, arguing that be-
cause Section 504 protects the same rights and offers the same remedies as 
Title II, there is no need to decide the question of the ADA’s constitutional-
ity in that case. 
CONCLUSION 
People with disabilities are all too well represented in America’s prisons 
and are frequently not provided with the accommodations necessary to en-
sure their full participation in prison life.  The Supreme Court’s 1997 pro-
nouncement that Title II of the ADA applies to their claims of failure to ac-
commodate and disability-based discrimination has been making its way 
through the prison grapevine (and hopefully the prison law libraries) over 
the last dozen years, inspiring prisoners, their advocates and the federal 
government to use this broad civil rights statute to enforce these rights.  
Their efforts have been thwarted to some extent by the states’ assertion of 
sovereign immunity from suits for money damages.  To ensure greater suc-
cess and ease in litigating claims of disability-based discrimination, prison-
ers and their advocates should be strategic about the claims they raise 
rather than employ a kitchen-sink approach to litigation.  Determinations 
must be made about whether to abandon constitutional claims in favor of 
statutory ones and whether the ADA’s predecessor statute, Section 504, 
provides equivalent protection and should be invoked in lieu of the ADA to 
avoid dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds. 
